Supreme Court of Canada
National Life Assur. Co. Of Canada v. McCoubrey,  S.C.R. 277
National Life Assurance Company of Canada (Defendant) Appellant;
Florence McCoubrey (Plaintiff) Respondent.
1926: March 4, 8; 1926: March 13.
Present: Anglin C.J.C. and Idington, Duff, Mignault and Newcombe JJ.
Life insurance—Designation of preferred beneficiary in policy—Subsequent will—Right to recover under policy without furnishing letters probate—Life Insurance Act, Alta., 1924, c. 13—Ontario Insurance Act. 1924, c. 50—Appeal to Supreme Court of Canada—Supreme Court Act, s. 2e.—Final judgment—Order in “exercise of judicial discretion”—Quashing appeal as being manifestly devoid of merit.
S. 28 of The Life Insurance Act of Alberta (1924, c. 13) or s. 139 of The Ontario Insurance Act, 1924 (c. 50), in expressly creating a trust of the insurance moneys in favour of the beneficiary (or beneficiaries) in the preferred class, not only takes the moneys out of the estate of the insured, but makes clear the status of the designated preferred beneficiary to recover the same from the insurer, without intervention of the insured’s personal representatives, as a trust fund in the hands of the insurer of which such beneficiary is the owner in equity.
If, where either of said statutes apply, a wife is named as sole beneficiary in a policy of insurance on her husband’s life, and it appears that subsequent to the date of the policy he made a will, produced and sworn to by her as his last will, which declares her to be the Bole beneficiary of his life insurance, and no reason is shown for believing that any alteration in the designation of beneficiary has been made, the insurer is not entitled to require the production of letters probate as a condition precedent to payment to such beneficiary. A requirement of the policy that the “title of the person claiming shall be duly proven” is satisfied by the production of the policy naming the claimant as sole beneficiary. Letters probate of the deceased’s will form no part of her chain of title.
If an appeal, though within the jurisdiction Of the court, be manifestly entirely devoid of merit or substance, the court will entertain favourably a motion-to quash it.
The plaintiff sued to recover the amount of a policy of insurance and interest thereon, and, having begun action by a specially endorsed writ, moved before a judge in chambers for speedy judgment under Order XIV, r. 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, and it was ordered that judgment be entered for the plaintiff for the sum mentioned in the policy and that the action should proceed as to the demand for interest. The order was affirmed by the Court of Appeal for British Columbia.
Held, the order for judgment was a “final judgment” as now defined in s. 2 (e) of the Supreme Court Act (R.S.C. 1906, c. 139, as amended); also it was not an order amounting merely to an exercise of judicial discretion within the purview of s. 38 of said Act; and grounds urged under those sections against the defendant’s right of appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada were not maintainable; but the court, applying the principles stated in the first part of this head-note, quashed the appeal on the ground that it was manifestly devoid of merit.
MOTION by the plaintiff (respondent) to quash an appeal taken by the defendant from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia affirming an order made by a judge in chambers, on a motion for speedy judgment under Order XIV, r. 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, that judgment be entered for the plaintiff against the defendant for the principal sum mentioned in a policy of life insurance, and that the action should proceed as to the demand for interest.
W. D. Herridge for the motion.
G. F. Macdonnell contra.
The judgment of the court was delivered by
Ànglin C.J.C.—The plaintiff (respondent) sues in the Supreme Court of British Columbia to recover the amount of a policy of insurance ($7,500) on the life of her late husband,
and interest thereon. She is the sole beneficiary named in the policy. The defendant company, under authority of a judge in chambers, entered a conditional appearance. It, no doubt, intended to dispute the jurisdiction of the British Columbia court, although it does business in that province and is registered there as an extra-provincial company. The insured made application for the insurance at Calgary, Alberta, where he then resided. He removed to Vancouver a short time before his death which occurred there on the 29th of March, 1925. The head office of the insurance company is at Toronto and the policy is payable there. Objection to the jurisdiction of the British Columbia Court appears to have been subsequently abandoned.
“Proofs of loss” were duly made by the claimant on forms furnished by the defendant company. The only exception taken to their sufficiency was the absence of probate of the last will of the insured. To a question in the forms as to the existence of such a will the answer made by the claimant was: “Yea, but not yet probated” The plaintiff declined to comply with the demand of the company that she should furnish probate on the ground that the will of the insured was not an element in her title to the insurance moneys and that to obtain it would put her unnecessarily to very great expense. She did, however, furnish the company with what she, in her affidavit made in support of the motion for judgment, swore to be
her husband’s last will and testament which was executed by him just before he went to St. Paul’s Hospital in the city of Vancouver on his last illness.
This document bears date of 24th of January, 1925, and contains a clause which declares the plaintiff sole beneficiary of her husband’s life insurance. The plaintiff also deposed that she is solely entitled to the insurance moneys in question.
Having begun this action by a specially endorsed writ, the plaintiff moved before a judge in chambers for speedy judgment under order XIV r. 1 of the rules of the Supreme Court of British Columbia. She was not cross-examined, as she might have been, oil her affidavit filed in support of this motion which contained both the foregoing statements; nor were they contradicted.
The only grounds of defence suggested in answer to the motion were the plaintiff’s failure to produce the letters probate of her husband’s last will and to furnish the defendant with a formal discharge for the moneys payable under the policy. In reply the plaintiff asserted that production of this discharge had been dispensed with by the company’s officers. She has, nevertheless, executed such a document and offers to furnish that or any other form of release which the company may demand. No exception has been taken to the sufficiency in form of the discharge thus offered.
No material fact is in dispute and no fact is suggested in the affidavits filed on behalf of the defendant in answer to the motion for judgment which casts the slightest doubt on the plaintiff’s right to immediate payment of the insurance moneys. The only ground for resisting her claim to judgment preferred at bar in this court is the absence of such further assurance as probate would furnish that the document which she has sworn is her husband’s last will is such in fact. Subject to this objection, the liability of the defendant to pay the policy sued upon is admitted.
It is obvious that probate would not afford any assurance that the insured had not, subsequently to the 24th of January, 1925 (the date of the will sworn to), executed another “declaration” under the Life Insurance Act of Alberta (Alta. statute, 1924, c. 13, s. 25 et seq.), not in the form of a will or codicil, altering the designation of beneficiary as permitted by s. 29 of the statute. Identical statutory provisions exist in Ontario (Ont. statutes, 1924, c. 50, s. 136 et seq.) where the defendant suggests that the contract of insurance was made, British Columbia (R.S.B.C., 1924, c. 117, s. 25 et seq.), Manitoba (Statutes of 1924, c. 99, s. 25 et seq.), Saskatchewan (Statutes of 1924, s. 31, s. 194 (d) et seq.), New Brunswick (Statutes of 1924, c. 31, s. 25 et seq.), Nova Scotia (Statutes of 1925, c. 2, s. 25 et seq.) and Prince Edward Island (Statutes of 1924, c. 9, s. 25 et seq.). In the province of Quebec, chapter 244 of the Revised Statutes of 1925 makes provisions in some respects similar. For present purposes it is immaterial whether the rights of the parties in respect of the insurance moneys in question are governed by the Ontario statute or by the Alberta
statute. So far as they are material the provisions of both are the same.
If the defendant company should be entitled in the present case, as a condition precedent to payment, to require the production of letters probate or other proof that the insured had not by subsequent “declaration” within s. 29 of the Alberta statute (s. 140 of the Ontario statute) altered the designation of the beneficiary named in the policy sued upon, wherever alteration of beneficiary is permitted under the law any claim by a preferred beneficiary for payment to him according to the tenor of a matured policy of life insurance may be successfully resisted on similar grounds without alleging, or offering evidence of, the existence of any reason for believing that any alteration in the designation of beneficiary has in fact been made. Section 28 of the Alberta statute (s. 139 of the Ontario statute), in expressly creating a trust of the insurance moneys in favour of the beneficiary (or beneficiaries) in the preferred class, not only takes the moneys out of the estate of the insured but makes clear the status of the designated preferred beneficiary to recover the same from the insurer, without intervention of the insured’s personal representatives, as a trust fund in the hands of the insurer of which such beneficiary is the owner in equity. Gregory v. Williams; Re Empress Engineering Co.; Gandy v. Gandy. The case at bar is thus clearly distinguished from In re Engelback’s Estate, Tibbets v. Engelback; and similar authorities. See Re Fleetwood’s Policy.
The learned judge in chambers, on the 11th of August, 1925, ordered that judgment be entered for the plaintiff against the defendant company for the principal sum mentioned in the policy and that the action should proceed as to the demand for interest. On appeal this order was unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeal for British Columbia on January 5, 1926, the court being of opinion that the affidavits filed on behalf of the defendant disclosed no defence to the action.
The defendant has appealed to this court. The plaintiff moves to quash the appeal. Two grounds were originally
urged at bar in support of the motion, (a) that the order for judgment was not a final judgment within s. 2 (e), and (b) that it was an order made in the exercise of judicial discretion and, therefore, unappealable under s. 38 of the Supreme Court Act.
Formerly, when only
a judgment, rule, order or decision whereby the action, suit, cause, matter, or other judicial proceeding (was) finally determined and concluded
was a “final judgment” for the purposes of appeal to this court, an order for judgment, however conclusive of the rights of the parties in controversy in the action, was not so regarded, Rural Municipality of Morris v. London & Canadian Loan Co.. But, under the present definition of “final judgment,” i.e.,
any judgment, rule, order or decision which determines in whole or in part any substantive right of any of the parties in controversy in any judicial proceeding (s. 2 (e)),
the final character of an order for judgment such as that before us is indubitable.
Nor does such an order amount merely to an exercise of judicial discretion within the purview of s. 38. In directing judgment the judge in chambers—and the Court of Appeal in affirming him—necessarily determined judicially that the matters urged in answer to the plaintiff’s claim were devoid of merit and afforded no substantial ground of defence. Such a decision and the order giving effect to it are not discretionary, although an order dismissing a motion for judgment, if based on the view that the suggested defences disclose matter which should be disposed of after trial rather than summarily upon motion, may be discretionary as well as not final.
Upon the argument of the motion, however, it was suggested to counsel for the respondent that he should consider the advisability of asking that the appeal be quashed for such manifest lack of substance as would bring it within the character of vexatious proceedings designed merely to delay the plaintiff’s recovery—“proceedings against good faith.” Supreme Court Act, s. 50; Fontaine v. Payette. Every court of justice has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent such abuse of its own procedure,
Reichel v. McGrath. If an appeal, though within its jurisdiction, be manifestly entirely devoid of merit or substance, this court will entertain favourably a motion to quash it, as it does in cases where costs only are involved, (Schlomann v. Dowker; Angers v. Duggan, 19 Feb., 1907, Cameron, 3rd Ed., p. 92; M oir v. Huntingdon; Assn. Pharmaceutique v. Fauteux, 20 Feb., 1923), as a convenient way of disposing of the appeal before further costs have been incurred. The motion stood over to permit counsel to consider it from this aspect and was subsequently further argued.
After full consideration we are satisfied that the appeal lacks merit and that interference with the order for judgment, unanimously affirmed by the provincial appellate court, would be clearly unjustifiable.
Liability on the policy is admitted. The only defence suggested is that production of probate of the last will of the insured is a condition precedent to the plaintiff’s right to payment. The policy requires that the
title of the person claiming shall be duly proven.
That condition was satisfied by the production of the policy which named the plaintiff as sole beneficiary. The statute makes her a preferred beneficiary and a cestui qui trust entitled to claim payment to herself on maturity of the policy. Letters probate of the will of the deceased form no part of her chain of title. Moreover, the statute—whether that of Ontario or that of Alberta applies—explicitly protects the insurer making payment to her as such beneficiary against any claim that might afterwards be made under an “instrument in writing affecting the insurance money” of which it had not received notice before such payment. (Alberta statute, s. 40; Ontario statute, s. 151). Under both statutes “instrument in writing” includes a will. There is no adverse claimant for the moneys and no suggestion that the insurer has received any notice of such an instrument. Nothing set up by the defendant affords it the shadow of a defence either in fact or in law.
The motion will accordingly be granted and the appeal dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs.